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ABSTRACT: 
 
This thesis examines the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the firm value of the acquirer in the Finnish 
construction industry. In this study, firm value is measured by the price development of the publicly traded 
stock of the acquirer. The sample data includes events occurring during 2001 to 2019 and is limited to 
Finnish publicly listed and traded construction companies. Stock market data consists of individual stock 
price data collected from the Helsinki Stock Exchange and M&A data collected from ThomsonReuters. 
According to previous research in this field of mergers and acquisitions, it is found that most transactions 
tend to destroy firm value in contrary to their preliminary purpose. Previous research has mainly focused 
on the construction industries of the United Kingdom and United States. There has been little research in 
value creation of mergers and acquisitions in the Finnish construction industry or other industries. 
 
The empirical part of the research is conducted by using the event study methodology which is an appro-
priate method for examining the effects of mergers and acquisitions. The value effect of the event is meas-
ured by the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirer’s stock. The chosen bench-
mark is the OMX Helsinki index. The chosen event windows for the examination are [-20, 20], [-10, 10], 
[-5, 5] and [-1, 1]. Furthermore, a t-test is conducted to test the statistical significance of the empirical 
results. The first hypothesis of this thesis proposes that mergers and acquisitions have a negative impact on 
the firm value of the acquirer in the Finnish construction industry. The second hypothesis suggests that 
vertical mergers create more value for the acquirer measured by abnormal returns than horizontal mergers 
do. 
 
The study examines the first hypothesis by examining the cumulative abnormal returns at the end of each 
event window. Transactions are considered successful in case they generate positive cumulative abnormal 
returns at the end of each event window. The results suggest that in short-term mergers and acquisitions in 
the Finnish construction industry tend to generate negative or extremely moderate positive cumulative ab-
normal returns and vertical M&A’s do generate not only superior but also positive cumulative abnormal 
returns in comparison to horizontal transactions, however the t-tests show statistical insignificance. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The amount of mergers and acquisitions in general as well as in the construction industry 
have been increasing during the recent years. Only in 2017, there were a hundred thou-
sand global mergers with a total value of approximately 4,7 billion dollars. In the engi-
neering and construction industry there were 3506 deals with a total value of over 251 
million dollars globally. The construction industry environment has been favorable for 
new mergers and acquisitions as there has been increasing demand for both domestic and 
cross-country market opportunities as well as existing demands in aging infrastructure. 
(Bureau van Dijk 2017.) 
 
These kinds of mergers and acquisitions have occurred mostly in cyclical periods, com-
panies either taking advantage of periods with lower asset prices to invest in mergers and 
acquisitions or during times with higher prices. The first kind of behavior in carrying out 
corporate mergers and acquisitions is known as anticyclical behavior, the latter being pro-
cyclical behavior. Previous studies show that M&A behavior is most often considered to 
be procyclical, indicating the common notion that most of mergers and acquisitions fail 
to succeed. Merger and acquisition related procyclical decision-making is done during 
upturn cycles in the economy, often not taking into consideration the following value-
decreasing downturn. (Eisenbarth & Meckl 2014.) This economic cyclicity and capability 
of future-looking development among other factors impacts the success of a merger or 
acquisition which this study will also contribute to by investigating whether mergers and 
acquisitions create value for the acquiring company in the Finnish construction industry. 
 
1.1.   Purpose of this study 
 
The purpose of this study is to provide an understanding on theories of mergers and ac-
quisitions and eventually examine whether mergers and acquisitions create or destroy 
value of the acquiring company and secondly, whether vertical mergers and acquisitions 
tend to succeed better in creating acquirer value than horizontal M&A’s. The value crea-
tion in this study is considered as an increase in the stock price of an a publicly listed 
acquiring company compared to a benchmark stock market index. In other words, the 
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abnormal increase or decrease on the company’s stock price returns indicates the success 
or failure of a merger or acquisition. The study concentrates in the stock price develop-
ment during a short-term period and the changes in the stock price will be measured be-
fore, during and after the transaction using chosen event windows. This study has been 
limited to recent mergers and acquisitions in the Finnish construction industry between 
years 2001-2019. 
 
This kind of limitation has been done to provide a research on an industry combined with 
a limitation of a geographical area where mergers and acquisitions and their value crea-
tion for the acquirer has not been researched. Transactions in the construction industry in 
general have been researched very little. The merger waves of recent decades in the Nor-
dic construction industry have worked as a stimulus for this study. 
  
1.2.   Hypotheses  
 
The hypotheses of this study are based on earlier studies on whether mergers and acqui-
sitions create value for the acquirer measured by changes in stock price and they follow 
the empirical results of Savor & Lu (2009), Kedia, Ravid & Pons (2011), Moeller and 
Schlingemann & Stulz (2005). These previous studies related to M&A success and value 
creation find that there are negative abnormal returns for the acquirer post-merger. Thus, 
the first hypothesis of this paper is: 
 
H1: Mergers and acquisitions have a negative impact on firm value of the acquirer in the 
Finnish construction industry. 
 
Secondly, previous studies have shown support on the differing success of vertical and 
horizontal mergers. Thus, Raudszus et al. (2014) works as the motivation for the second 
hypothesis of this study which is: 
 
H2: Vertical mergers create more value for the acquirer through abnormal returns than 
horizontal mergers do. 
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1.3.   Structure of the thesis 
 
The study is structured in a logical order with first introducing mergers and acquisitions 
in the introduction. After the introduction, a theory section will follow with the main 
concepts of mergers and acquisitions and the key theories in increasing or decreasing 
corporate stock value. A description of the merger and acquisition process will follow 
which will include the examination of key factors in M&A success or failure. After that, 
a literature review of previous research in transactions in general and in the construction 
industry as well as the differentiating performance of vertical and horizontal M&A’s is 
introduced. Value creation will follow with a description on the data and methodology 
used in this study. Lastly, the empirical results of the research will be presented with the 
final summary and conclusions. 
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2.   MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
The primary purpose of a merger or acquisition is to combine two businesses to achieve 
synergy. This maintains sustainability, competitiveness and growth for the business. Mer-
gers and acquisitions are a part of a firm’s business strategy, an option for corporate ex-
pansion and vital growth. A successful merger or acquisition consists of a long process 
which includes careful strategical management of both pre- and post-transaction related 
factors. (Weber 1996.) 
 
Mergers and acquisitions can be classified into three groups depending on the basis of the 
merger type: vertical, horizontal and conglomerate. When two companies at different 
stages of production merge, it is called a vertical merger. Vertical mergers provide the 
acquirer the ownership over the target firm but also control of the whole chain of produc-
tion. (Kedia, Ravid & Pons 2011.) According to Fan & Goyal (2006) vertical merger 
activity does not only concentrate on specific industries but over time they have appeared 
in different industries such as oil and gas during the fourth merger wave and transporta-
tion equipment industry later in the 1990s. Horizontal mergers appear between firms op-
erating in the same industry. Contrary to a vertical merger, horizontal mergers increase 
industry concentration and decreases competition. (Pavlou 2015.) A conglomerate merger 
differs from the two earlier types of mergers. When two firms operating in different lines 
of business merge, they form a conglomerate merger. The acquisition between Google 
and Motorola works as an example of a conglomerate merger. (Chiu, Chung & Yang 
2016.) 
 
Although there is no particular constant pattern for a takeover, the process of a merger or 
an acquisition can be divided into two phases, the pre- and post-takeover phases. Specific 
success factors can be placed into these two stages of the process but other phases of the 
process can not be standardized as every acquisition and its characteristics are different. 
(Gomes 2013.) 
 
Mergers and acquisitions act as an opportunity to grow and develop also in the construc-
tion industry. Transactions in the construction industry grew rapidly in the 1990s during 
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the time of new technological innovations and economic globalization. Despite the radical 
increase of mergers and acquisitions in the construction industry, little research has been 
done in this area. Most previous research studies concentrate on businesses in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Previous research has shown that mergers and acquisi-
tions in the construction industry have at least to some extent outperformed transactions 
in other non-construction industries in the United States. (Choi & Russell 2004; Choi & 
Harmatuck 2006.) 
 
2.1.   History of mergers and acquisitions 
 
The past of mergers and acquisitions have shown that the field has a short memory and 
the characteristics of unsuccessful M&A’s tend to be forgotten as they are often repeated 
in later mergers and acquisitions. In this particular field, history shows a significant mean-
ing in recognizing the features of potentially failing deals and forecasting failure in time. 
The history of mergers and acquisitions can be sorted into merger waves, also known as 
periods of high activity in deals. These merger waves go back to the 1890s when the first 
wave took place. The 20th century has been the era of remarkable merger activity and four 
merger waves have been noticed during this time starting from 1904, 1916, 1965 and 
1984. A sixth short but intense merger wave is said to have taken place from 2003 to 
2007. (Gaughan 2012.) 
 
The first wave took place after the depression of 1883 in the US, having a peak in the turn 
of the century. It mainly targeted the industrial sector such as primary metals, machinery, 
bituminous coal and transportation equipment as the turn of the century was a period of 
high development in technology and industrial innovations. (Martynova & Renneboog 
2008.) According to Stigler (1950), the main reasons for mergers during the first merger 
wave were related to creating monopoly positions. The first merger wave ended in 1904 
when antitrust laws were set to prevent excessive formation of monopolies in the econ-
omy. This period has also been referred to as the Great Merger Wave as the mergers 
carried out during this period formed large multinational corporations which have had 
extremely long-run impacts both in the US economy and across borders. 
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The second merger wave started in 1916 after the more small-scale M&A activity during 
First World War and began bringing more than one operator in the industries that had 
previously had a monopoly. Through mergers smaller companies aimed for growth and 
economy of scale to compete with the leading firm in the industry. During this time, in-
dustries such as automobiles and agricultural tools were affected by high merger activity. 
The equity market crashed in 1929 with the great depression following the years after 
which was also the end for the second merger wave. (Stigler 1950.) 
 
As a consequence of the depression, the merger activity retained at a modest level for 
almost half a century. In the early 1950s the US set more strict antitrust laws which began 
the trend of merging for diversification of products and services. Mergers were done to 
expand businesses over the borders of their primary business which created value and 
decreased the volatility of their earnings. (Martynova & Renneboog 2008.) During the 
first two mergers, investment bankers financed most of the mergers until the 1960s. As 
demand for higher credit during the third merger wave, credit markets tightened and in-
terest rates increased. As the oil crisis broke out in 1973, the economy suffered a recession 
and thus, ended the third merger wave. (Gaughan 2012.) 
 
The fourth wave took place from 1984 to 1989. The stock market had rose from the eco-
nomic recession and merger activity began to increase. The main feature of the fourth 
merger wave are the hostile mergers which occurred remarkably more often than in the 
previous takeover waves. (Gaughan 2012.) Mergers are often referred to as hostile or 
friendly which reflects the public attitude of the merger target towards the offer made by 
the acquirer. Hostility refers to a negative attitude towards the offer that is then rejected 
by the target. When the target approves the takeover, it is considered friendly. (Schwert 
2000.) During the fourth wave especially in the US the size of the deals increased radi-
cally and the largest companies in the country were targets of mergers and acquisitions. 
The wave of the megamergers affected especially industries such as oil and gas. In the 
late 1980s the long economic expansion ended and the junk bond market collapsed which 
lead to the end of the fourth merger wave. (Gaughan 2012.) 
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As the economic globalization rose, technological innovations sparked and financial mar-
kets boomed in the end of the 20th century, the fifth merger wave occurred. Compared to 
the four earlier merger waves, the fifth wave had a wider reach. Takeovers emerged in 
Asia and there were nearly as many mergers and acquisitions in Europe during the 1990s 
as in the US. As a result, cross-border mergers formed a notable proportion of takeovers. 
(Martynova & Renneboog 2008.) 
 
The sixth merger wave was fueled by low interest rates after the recession ended in the 
beginning of the 21st century. The private equity industry benefitted from the rising mar-
ket and companies could be bought with attractive prices and later on sold at a profit. As 
the industry thrived, the need for takeover targets increased. The sixth wave was relatively 
short compared to the earlier merger waves but intense measured by deals volume. As the 
subprime crisis occurred in 2007, the low interest debt was cut off and merger activity 
dropped as investors lost interest. (Gaughan 2012). 
 
The mergers and acquisitions activity in the Nordic countries increased significantly dur-
ing the fifth merger wave in the end of the 20th century. After the turn of the millennium, 
the size of the Nordic mergers and acquisitions market covered approximately 15 percent 
of all domestic and 22 percent of all cross-border transactions in Europe. Most of the 
mergers and acquisitions in the Nordics were cross-border transactions during the begin-
ning of the 21st century. The Nordic countries sparked large M&A target interest in the 
United Kingdom as the countries had a similar corporate governance legislation and in-
stitutional financial environment and they showed strongly positive cumulative average 
abnormal returns for the acquirer. In addition, Scandinavian M&A bidders have shown 
positive announcement effects compared to the European Union enlargement. 
(Martynova & Renneboog 2006.) 
 
2.2.   Theories of mergers and acquisitions 
 
This chapter introduces the common theories of mergers and acquisitions and hypotheses 
that drives the research of M&A value creation. The motives behind carrying out a merger 
or an acquisition do not rely on one single theory but various theories. These motives 
18 
 
depending on how the planning of the strategy pre-M&A and the integration phase post-
M&A are carried out may lead to increase or decrease in firm value and synergies. 
 
2.2.1.   Efficiency theory 
 
The efficiency theory refers to a merger or acquisition as a planned action to achieve 
synergies. Synergies can be classified to financial, operational and managerial synergies. 
According to the efficiency theory, financial synergies through M&A’s offer the firm a 
possibility to lower its cost of capital either by decreasing its systematic risk by expanding 
the investment portfolio to businesses unrelated to the core focus of the firm or broaden-
ing the firm’s size and thus receiving capital with a lower cost. A third way for a firm to 
achieve financial synergies is to allocate its capital more efficiently by affiliating with an 
internal capital market. (Trautwein 1990.) An internal capital market enables a firm’s 
headquarters to allocate the capital efficiently to the divisions within the corporation with 
highest returns. (Stein 1997.) However, there has been argument whether an efficient in-
ternal capital market can exist. Montgomery & Singh (1984) show that there is in fact no 
evidence for a lower systematic risk than the market portfolio. 
 
Operational synergies can be achieved by bringing together two or more previously sep-
arate business units or transferring knowledge between these. (Trautwein 1990.) Mana-
gerial synergies are achieved when the managers of a merger or acquisition succeeds to 
create superior performance and returns by concentrating and managing on a specific 
project or deciding to pursue or drop one. (Jensen & Murphy 1988.) Operational and 
managerial synergies have been a target of criticism as they often are referred to as a 
motive for mergers and acquisition but are rarely possible to be realized. (Kitching 1967.) 
 
There has been research aiming to prove the efficiency theory in stock markets and event 
studies such as mergers and acquisitions. The stock market generally values mergers and 
acquisitions positively, however this does not eventually show in firms’ actual perfor-
mance. The theory holds whether one trusts the stock market to be efficient and values it 
more reliable than the firms’ financial statements. Otherwise, the efficiency theory must 
be rejected. (Trautwein 1990.) 
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2.2.2.   Synergy theory 
 
The synergy theory proposes that the value of two businesses combined is greater than 
their sum when functioning separately. In his study, Kitching (1967) concentrated on the 
ease of achieving synergies through mergers and acquisitions and the dollar value of these 
synergies. Managers of the sample transactions remain quite skeptical about synergies 
and do not give value for them when evaluating a merger or acquisition and its value 
creation. The largest potential for synergies are among production related mergers where 
long production lines can be made more efficient and thus, the purchase of more costly 
machinery can be justified. In addition, quantity discounts are given as the purchasing 
power and economies of scale increase. Due to the possibility to share R&D and 
knowledge, technology is another highly potential area for synergy benefits through mer-
gers and acquisitions. M&A synergies in the marketing area enable a firm to sell two 
different products through one distribution line and takeovers in the organization area in 
turn eliminate duplicate functions. However, Kitching (1967) finds that the greatest syn-
ergy release and largest ease of achievement is derived from financial mergers compared 
to any other type of merger. 
 
Leland (2007) examines the magnitude and existence of purely financial synergies in 
mergers and acquisitions and the financial benefits difference between a merger situation 
and two separate firms. The scope of the financial synergy is dependent on factors such 
as tax rates, the relative size and the riskiness of cash flows. If the risk levels or default 
costs differ radically between the two parties of a merger, the financial synergies can be 
negative. In his study, Leland (2007) does not rely on Modigliani-Miller’s (1958) theory 
of a world without taxes and bankruptcy because in that case there would be no purely 
financial synergies. As capital structure has a significance, taxes and bankruptcy costs are 
taken into consideration and operational cash flows are non-synergistic. He finds that 
financial synergies achieved from mergers or acquisitions have a higher possibility to be 
positive in situations where correlations and volatilities are low. 
 
2.2.3.   Hubris hypothesis 
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A common motive for takeovers according to Roll (1986) is the managerial hubris. The 
hubris theory is often used to explain excessive managerial overconfidence in mergers 
and acquisitions since the sole motive for merging or acquiring are the manager’s personal 
motives, not the synergies for the acquiring firm. Roll (1986) suggests that managers of 
the acquiring companies overvalue potential merger targets because they estimate the 
synergies to be higher than they eventually are. As a result of incorrect valuation and 
excessive confidence, the bidding firm tend to overpay for takeover gains if they even 
exist at all. In mergers and acquisitions, the CEO hubris is often also referred to as the 
winner’s curse. The winner’s curse refers to a bidding situation of a target firm where a 
range of bids is placed. The average of the bids set equals the underlying value of the 
firm. However, the winning bid is always higher than the average which leads to the win-
ner overpaying. (Varaiya 1988.)  
 
A study by Brown & Sarma (2007) show that CEO overconfidence and dominance are a 
key factor in explaining the decision for a takeover. The results show that the CEO dom-
inance has at least as equal significance for the transaction as the CEO hubris and finds 
support on Heaton’s (2002) proposition of an independent board of directors being an 
effective way to diminish CEO hubris. Malmendier & Tate (2005) test the hubris hypoth-
esis of CEO’s on corporate investment decisions and similarly find that there is a positive 
correlation between the managerial sensitivity of investing and overconfidence. Overcon-
fidence has a stronger impact in equity dependent firms. The study suggests that in order 
to mitigate the CEO hubris, some discipline regarding CEO incentives should be placed. 
 
2.2.4.   Empire-building theory 
 
The empire-building theory claims that the planning and execution of mergers and acqui-
sitions are done by managers who aim to maximize their own benefits instead of the 
stockholders. (Trautwein 1990.) The background behind this theory is introduced in the 
study by Berle & Means (1933) on the relationship between the ownership over compa-
nies and corporate control. Later studies have taken the study by Berle & Means (1933) 
further and formed theories and models based on this background study. Mueller (1969) 
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studies the interdependence of corporate growth maximization in mergers and managers’ 
future expectations of future earnings compared to stockholders’.  
 
Among the theories of mergers and acquisitions, the empire-building theory has been the 
most honored. This is due to the vast range of theories that the larger concept of empire-
building theory covers with each of these theories having its own limitations. In addition, 
the empire-building theory hasn’t been a target of large research which results to little 
evidence so far and increasing interest in further research. (Trautwein 1990.) 
 
2.2.5.   Size theory 
 
Gorton, Kahl & Rosen (2009) suppose that companies do not merge with other companies 
that are larger than themselves. For this reason there is most often a less amount of inter-
ested acquirers for the considerably larger target companies. The reason for the phenom-
enon of the size theory is due to transactions with larger target companies involved often 
requiring more assets and effort from the acquiring firm. These kind of large mergers and 
acquisitions also have a higher risk of financial loss in the case of possible failure or 
withdrawal of the deal. In addition, in larger transactions there might be for example re-
quirements for preliminary payments or other resources in the deal terms even before the 
transaction itself. (Eisenbarth & Meckl 2014.) 
 
2.3.   Measuring value creation and success in mergers and acquisitions 
 
In the case of a merger or acquisition where the acquirer is a publicly listed and traded 
firm, it is important to understand the determinant of success or failure in a transaction. 
Success of the merger and acquisition for the acquirer can be measured by the value cre-
ated through the transaction. The key element in measuring and determining this achieved 
value is the stock price of the acquiring public company. The price of the company’s 
share is a reflection of the investor’s future view of the company’s ability to offer growth 
and earnings. (Mellen & Evans 2018.) 
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There are also two other methodologies to examine the successfulness of a merger or 
acquisition. The first methodology is based on a rating method which gives manager’s 
the opportunity to evaluate the merger or acquisition success through questionnaires. (Ro-
zen-Bakher 2017). However, this method can include bias due to subjective opinions of 
the participants (Huber & Power 1985) and difficulties to compare pre- and post-M&A 
success or failure as positions tend to change as the transaction is carried out. (Weber, 
Shenkar & Raveh 1996).  
 
The third methodology is based on information received on accounting principles and 
financial statements from the company. This data is used to build a view on the develop-
ment of the company’s financials during pre- and post-M&A periods. In this method, it 
is believed that the value created by the transaction will reflect in the key figures of the 
financial statements of the firms such as market share, sales, cash flows and solvency. 
(Changjun & Qiaoyue 2014). 
 
According to Das & Kapil (2012) the main assumption behind event studies, such as mer-
gers and acquisitions, is that the markets are efficient and stock market participants react 
to the announcement of a deal immediately. This reaction causes fluctuation in the price 
of the company’s stock and thus is a reflection of the investor’s view on whether the 
transaction generates value for the acquiring firm in future after the deal. Short-term value 
impacts of mergers and acquisitions can be well measured by short-term stock price de-
velopment. However, if the transaction objectives are more strategic and the success of a 
deal is determined more from the viewpoint of for example the level of success in post-
merger integration, investigating only short-term stock prices does not reflect the success 
or failure of the deal. In this study, however, we are specifically interested in the short-
term stock price value creation before, during and after an announcement of a deal. 
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3.   MERGER AND ACQUISITION FACTORS 
 
3.1.   Pre-transaction success factors 
 
The strategy formulation of the merger or acquisition is the first step in the process. The 
motives for the takeover are often based on the previous theories on mergers and acqui-
sitions and they form the main objectives and strategies of the transaction. (El Zuhairy, 
Taher & Shafei 2015.) This chapter will concentrate on describing the factors impacting 
the first half of the acquisition process, the pre-acquisition phase. 
 
3.1.1.   Evaluation of the partner 
 
The first step after recognizing the need for an acquisition is the evaluation of the strategic 
partner which consists of multiple factors. This process of careful evaluation of financials, 
tax matters, asset valuation, operations, and company valuation is also known as the due 
diligence process of the acquisition target. It is a comprehensive analysis of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the target firm with estimates on the company’s financial stability, 
cash flows, competitiveness and ability to meet its strategic targets. (Kissin & Herrera 
1990.) The due diligence process is neutral, however in the case of cross-border mergers 
there can be disagreement on the role of due diligence. Due diligence provides not only 
the acquirer but also the advisors and lenders confidence on the acquisition and the risks 
associated with it. The due diligence process can consists of evaluation of the target firm’s 
industry, history, development, products and services, management, accounting policies, 
information systems and financial performance. As due diligence has a critical role in the 
merger and acquisition process and it often affects every aspect of the business, it is a 
large expense for the acquiring company. (Angwin 2001.) 
 
3.1.2.   Size 
 
Earlier research finds that the level of similarity in the size of the buy- and sell side firm 
has effects on the merger or acquisition outcome. In mergers and acquisitions, this kind 
of difference in the size can be referred to as “size mismatch.” Kitching (1967) studied 
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the reasons for miscarrying mergers in the 1960’s and found that there is a size mismatch 
in 84 percent of the sample mergers. A mismatch was defined as the acquired company 
having less than 2 percent of the acquiring company’s sales volume. In situations with 
large size mismatches the management has to pay special attention to the integration of 
the acquired company and use the right kind of organizational structure and reporting 
between parties. Often during the integration the organization structure is altered towards 
a more consolidated model which in worst case means confusion on reporting relation-
ships both in the acquiring and the target firm. 
 
3.1.3.   Pre-transaction communication 
 
Communication between the buy and sell side during the whole merger or acquisition 
process has a crucial role. Bastien (1987) finds that the three central issues regarding the 
pre-transaction communication are pervasive personal uncertainty, coping with this un-
certainty and sudden switches and culture shocks. Personal uncertainty associated with 
the transaction is not only an issue of the executives and managers but is spread on all 
levels of the organization. Uncertainty is described to be mostly a loss of certainty in 
corporate control, power and influence but also in some cases in the income security. The 
highest level of uncertainty can be noticed on the early phases of the integration of a 
merger or acquisition. 
 
Concerns among the acquired firm and its employees can turn into expectations of the 
fusion and how it affects immediately themselves and eventually also their work group. 
Issues can be related to short-term employment but also long-term behavioral and cultural 
factors. Factors affecting how these concerns are dealt with depends on superiority of the 
employee and the level of integration done by the acquirer. Managing the employees of 
the acquired firm and their expectations during the whole merger process plays a vital 
role. This can be done by ensuring high quality and consistency of communication, trust 
in the management, credibility of leadership, believable information and fairness in the 
actions. (Hubbard & Purcell 2001.) 
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3.1.4.   Valuation and price of the transaction 
 
According to Goold, Campbell & Alexander (1994) the most common way of destroying 
firm value through a merger or an acquisition is to simply pay too much. Thus, the key 
factor in the pre-transaction stage is finding the correct price for the takeover. While it is 
critical that the valuation of the target company is done correctly, previous literature also 
show that the form of payment affects the outcome of the takeover. Bower (2001) and 
Howell (1970) suggest that friendly deals using stock as a payment for the acquisition 
perform better than the ones using cash. 
 
Eccles, Lanes & Wilson (1999) propose that the key of merger and acquisition valuation 
is knowing the highest price you are willing to pay and keep the discipline to stick to this 
price. The study concentrated on investigating how one should know the amount to pay 
for an acquisition and the logic behind the decision-making. This was done by interview-
ing 75 senior executives from 40 companies with a long history of experience and skills 
from acquisitions. Although highly skilled with expertise, some senior executives showed 
excessive attachment and emotion towards a takeover. The results showed that the key 
for senior executives and board members to a right acquisition with the right price was a 
combination of analytical punctuality and discipline during the whole process.  
 
3.1.5.   Overall strategy and M&A experience 
 
Previous research shows that earlier experience in mergers and acquisitions more often 
results in a more successful transaction in comparison to acquirers that lack the experi-
ence. Continuous and accumulated experience that has resulted in successful transactions 
can be integrated to a new merger or acquisition with some changes depending on the 
characteristics, nature and timing of each individual case. Previous experience offer the 
potential of learning and possibly succeeding in a takeover, however, they often do fail 
due to the realization of this potential. The quality of the experience outweighs the quan-
tity of the experience. The learning process is referred to as an acquisition where superior 
takeover performance is generated. (Hayward 2002.) Contrary to Hayward (2002), 
Jemison & Sitkin (1987) recall that learning through previous M&A experience only 
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matters when these transaction are done in a more intense pace which limits the amount 
of firms that can actually learn from previous M&A’s rather small. Collins, Holcomb, 
Certo, Hitt & Lester (2009) take the research further and separate the previous M&A 
experience of a firm to cross-border and domestic transactions. Previous experience in 
mergers and acquisitions in a specific country advances the acquirer to choose the same 
country for subsequent M&A’s in the future. Learning through previous processes is not 
only limited to a different environment but also experience in the selection of the target 
firm, negotiation of the deal and integration phase. 
 
3.1.6.   Courtship period 
 
Courtship period in mergers and acquisitions refers to a time period before the actual 
takeover. In addition to previous acquisition experience, an acquiring firm can have 
knowledge from previous relationships with the target firm and this can be developed 
during the courtship period. The purpose of this period is to help the two parties of the 
transaction to have a broader knowledge of each other by enabling access to inside infor-
mation and thus, preventing any challenges further in the integration phase. A courtship 
can emerge in the form of a joint venture, a specific project partner, a trading partner or a 
board-interlock. (Colombo, Conca, Buongiorno & Gnan 2007.) 
 
3.1.7.   Future compensation policy 
 
A future compensation for managers and CEOs on the acquiring side can work as an 
incentive for better success in the management of the takeover. Grinstein & Hribar (2004) 
find that superiors who have more influence on the decisions of the board receive higher 
bonuses but there is a positive relationship only between bonus compensation and effort, 
not bonus compensation and deal performance. From the sample of 327 large mergers 
and acquisitions during 1993 to 1999, 39% of the acquirers reward the CEO’s with bo-
nuses tied to the success of a transaction. More effort given by the CEO and a larger size 
of the deal increases the amount of the bonus. However, the deal size is positively corre-
lated with managerial power as CEO’s with more authority in the firm are more likely to 
get involved with larger deals. These finding are supported by Bebchuk, Fried & Walker 
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(2002) and Bebchuk & Fried (2003) in the studies of the relationship of managerial power 
and executive compensation. Managers and CEO’s can use their power to impact the 
compensation arrangements which are often paid in the form of cash bonuses. CEO’s and 
managers of mergers and acquisitions are aiming to maximize rent extraction and attempt 
to justify the compensation by the additional time and effort spent on the deals. 
 
3.2.   Post-transaction success factors 
 
Research confirms that the integration and implementation part of a merger or acquisition 
has a large effect on whether a transaction can be considered a success or a failure. These 
factors affecting the level of success of a deal after it is carried out are also known as the 
post-M&A factors. Thus, at least as much attention should be paid on the integration and 
implementation post-M&A as on the factors in the pre-transaction stage. (El Zuhairy, 
Taher & Shafei 2015.) 
 
3.2.1.   Integration 
 
A merger and acquisition process involves the post-M&A integration stage. It has been 
referred to as the most critical stage of a takeover as it realizes the potential of a merger 
or acquisition when successfully done. Before evaluating whether a strategy has suc-
ceeded in creating value for the acquirer, it is important to not only take into consideration 
how it has been implemented but also the outcomes of the strategy. (El Zuhairy et al. 
2015.) These findings are supported by Lubatkin (1987), Chatterjee (1986) and Singh & 
Montgomery (1987) with some limitations. 
 
In addition to the integration itself, the speed of the integration has an important role in 
the success of a takeover. Bauer, King & Matzler (2016) separate the integration in two 
categories, human and task integration. They find that the speed of both human and task 
integration have a significant impact on the performance of the transaction. The speed of 
task integration is negatively correlated with the performance while human integration 
has a positive correlation. Bauer et al. (2016) also find the relationship of cultural fit and 
the speed of integration as a factor of M&A performance. Cultural fit has a positive 
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relation with the task integration speed meaning that a better cultural fit decreases the 
negative effects of the faster task integration. These findings support the previous research 
on cultural fit and shareholder value creation by Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger & We-
ber (1992). A similar separation of human and task integration is done by Birkinshaw, 
Bresman & Håkanson (2000.)  
 
3.2.2.   Leadership 
 
An important factor in the process management of the merger or acquisition strategy after 
the takeover is leadership. Finding a suitable leader for the deal can be considered the 
single most important factor in carrying out the takeover. A study by Anslinger & 
Copeland (1996) finds that ensuring the right leader for carrying out a deal can be found 
in three ways. The current executives of the firm can be evaluated, non-leader managers 
within the firm can be considered or specialists outside the firm can be hired. From a 
sample of acquirers, nearly 85% kept the same managers in their roles also post-acquisi-
tion. Other successful acquirers found their managers elsewhere inside the company. 
There is found to be a slight difference between financial buyers and strategic corporate 
acquirers in their policy of replacing managers after the targets of the merger or acquisi-
tion are not met. Financial buyers tend to replace managers in leadership roles in average 
three times quicker than corporate ones. This is believed to be due to unwillingness of 
corporations to replace managers as they can have large effects on the firm’s culture. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the reasons for a failed merger or acquisition can be the sum of 
many factors. However, previous research has showed in increasingly that the main fac-
tors are human-related. (Mirvis 1985; Kavanagh & Ashkanasy 2006.) The empirical re-
sults of Covin, Kolenko, Sightler & Tudor (1997) show that the style of deal leadership 
has an effect on the transaction outcome and thus, should be taken into careful consider-
ation when planning a takeover. This is highlighted as a crucial part of the planning due 
to Schweiger & Denisi (1991) showing that in time these leadership issues tend to get 
worse, not forgotten.  
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3.2.3.   Integration team and alternatives for M&A’s 
 
The process of mergers and acquisitions are often time-consuming and tend to draw away 
attention from other daily business functions and internal growth of the firm. Ghemawat 
& Ghadar (2000) suggest that even though takeovers are considered a must for corporate 
growth and market power, many companies end up concentrating on internal innovations 
and development instead of mergers or acquisitions. This is seen as an alternative way to 
compete with industry competitors and modify the markets. Other alternatives for M&A’s 
are for example building corporate scale by forming relationships and alliances in the 
industry or instead of acquiring a business rather being the seller side of a deal. For firms 
seeking extremely risky cross-border M&A’s it might be a more safe option to consider 
domestic takeovers. 
 
Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) propose that the post-M&A organizational integration 
phase and its success is the most crucial single factor on realizing synergies. Synergies 
can only be realized properly if the organization post-transaction is managed well. Inkpen, 
Sundaram & Rockwood (2000) find that issues in the organizational integration can lead 
to employee dissatisfaction and defection. These issues are said to be destructive espe-
cially in companies that function in service-based industries. A separate coordination 
team for the post-M&A phase should be assigned to prevent this. 
 
3.2.4.   Communication during implementation 
 
Communication during the post-M&A integration is critical for the implementation pro-
cess. Successful communication requires coordination between managers and employees 
of the acquiring firm as well as between them and the acquired firm. Communication 
should be started already in the very early stages of the takeover. All stakeholders should 
be taken as a part of the merger or acquisition process, not solely given relevant infor-
mation during the process. (Budwar, Varma & Katou 2009.)  A study by Weber, Rach-
man-Moore & Tarba (2012) finds that communication during implementation is posi-
tively correlated with M&A performance. However, these findings vary between coun-
tries and the amount of need for communication during the M&A process can also differ 
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among cultures. Although Budwar et al. (2009) name communication as a critical part of 
M&A performance, some studies find that it can also have a contrary effect if done too 
intensively. Overcommunication destroys the needed flexibility of managers and makes 
it harder to react to unexpected situations.  
 
3.2.5.   Realization of synergies 
 
According to Sirower (1997) synergies in mergers and acquisitions can be explained as 
the increase in performance of the combined firm over what the two are already expected 
or required to accomplish as independent firms. Previous research has showed that syn-
ergies are an important motive for M&A’s but they often tend to be overestimated and 
not achieved. The synergy realization is often described as the measure of the economic 
success of the merger of acquisition. A value of synergy lower than expected signals an 
unsuccessful deal and failure of integration. (Gates & Very 2003.) 
  
Haspeslagh & Jemison (1987) propose four sources of synergy benefits: resource sharing, 
functional skill transfer, financial transfer and strategic logic. Resource sharing can elim-
inate overlaps and enhance effectiveness when resources are redirected in better use. In-
tangible resources such as a brand or intellectual property can also be shared. Functional 
skills refer to special know-how of the acquired firm for example related to technology 
or manufacturing innovations. Financial transfer benefits can be assets that the acquired 
firm provides for the acquirer to enable more lucrative growth of revenues. The last 
source, strategic logic refers to the new management of the target company. 
 
Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland (1991) have studied the relationship of synergies and 
post-acquisition performance. A common hypothesis in previous literature proposes that 
some form of relatedness of the acquirer and the target has a positive correlation on the 
value created from the acquisition. However, the study by Harrison et al. (1991) finds that 
related acquisitions do not necessarily create superior returns in comparison to unrelated 
acquisitions. In fact it shows that differences in the resource allocation between the target 
and acquirer may create synergy for unrelated firms. These findings are supported by 
Lubatkin (1987) who discovered that conversely to what he had hypothesized, horizontal 
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acquisitions did not create superior returns compared to vertical acquisitions. Jemison & 
Sitkin (1986) also noted that strategic fit alone does not guarantee superior synergies. 
This superior performance can only emerge if the synergies are realized effectively in the 
post-M&A integration phase. 
 
3.2.6.   Cultural fit 
 
One major factor in the history of unsuccessful M&A’s has been the differences in the 
cultural fit between the acquirer and target. During the recent year, the cultural fit has 
gained even more importance than the strategic fit in explaining the failure of mergers 
and acquisitions. The meaning of cultural fit is emphasized in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions where the cultural differences are not only limited to firms but entirely dif-
ferent nations. (Dauber 2012.) Some research done in this field of study confirm that the 
cultural factors have an impact on the outcomes of the transaction and the corporate en-
vironment. Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) show a negative correlation between the em-
ployee resistance and the synergy realization. The higher the resistance was, the less syn-
ergies the transaction generated. In addition, high differences in the management style of 
the two businesses resulted in high employee resistance. A study by Weber (1996) on a 
large sample of M&As found that the cultural differences between the acquired firm and 
the acquirer were negatively correlated with the effectiveness of the integration process 
even though the deals might have been financially successful. Similar results have been 
found by Datta (1991) and Chatterjee et al. (1992) on shareholder value.  
 
Although the majority of studies find that the cultural differences more often destruct the 
success of the integration, some studies find the opposite. Morosini, Shane & Singh 
(1998) argue whether cultural differences result in unsuccessful mergers and acquisitions. 
The study shows that firms seek for M&A targets in countries that share a similar culture 
in order to succeed in the transaction. However, the results show that if a firm merges 
with a target company that is located in a culturally distant country, they in fact perform 
well relative to the mergers and acquisitions done in culturally close countries. 
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4.   PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
The impact of mergers and acquisitions on the value of buy-side firms in the construc- 
tion industry has been researched previously in the United Kingdom by Delaney & 
Wamuziri (2004) and in the United States by Choi & Harmatuck (2006), Choi & Rus- 
sell (2004) and Savor & Lu (2009) among others. Raudszus, Schiereck & Trillig (2014) 
have studied the impacts of vertical diversification on firm value in the construction in-
dustry internationally. In general, value creation through mergers and acquisitions have 
been researched across industries by Alexandridis, Antypas & Travlos (2017) and Alex-
andridis, Fuller, Terhaar & Travlos (2013) among others. 
 
Savor & Lu (2009) have studied whether mergers create value for acquirers. The study 
concentrates on finding support on the hypothesis that overvalued firms create long- term 
value by using their equity as currency. They use a sample of mergers that have failed for 
exogenous reasons between years 1978 and 2003. The study shows that US acquisitions 
generate negative returns for the acquirer and acquirers tend to continue performing 
poorly even after merger failure. For the unsuccessful stock-bidders the study shows that 
negative returns are even higher and thus, they have come to the conclusion that mergers 
are most beneficial for the long-term shareholders. 
 
A study by Kedia, Ravid & Pons (2011) examines the market reaction to vertical mergers. 
According to Fan & Goyal (2006) vertical mergers provide the acquiring firm ownership 
and control over different stages of production of the target firm. Kedia et al. (2011) show 
in their results that there exists a trend of declining merger returns over the 1990s and 
abnormal returns for these vertical merger announcements are positive until the late 
1990s. After that the returns turn negative and significant to acquirers. These findings are 
supported also by previous studies by Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz (2005). 
 
Delaney and Wamuziri (2004) have studied the impacts of mergers and acquisitions on 
shareholder wealth and firm’s stock performance in the construction industry in the 
United Kingdom. Their study finds that there exists positive abnormal return for the 
shareholders of the buy-side firm and the target firm. In their event study they use the 
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standard market model and the mean adjusted return model to calculate the abnormal re- 
turns. Abnormal returns are estimated over an observation period of -20 to 20 days around 
each merger announcement. The results of the study show that in the construction industry 
in the UK mergers generate significant positive returns for the target firm but for the buy-
side firm they generate only small value in a longer observation window. 
 
The study by Choi & Russell (2004) examines the economic gains on mergers and acqui-
sitions in the construction industry in the U.S. by testing to hypotheses. First, share- hold-
ers of construction firms can not realize significant economic gains in mergers and acqui-
sitions. Second, the benefit to shareholders of related diversification oriented construction 
firms is higher than that of unrelated diversification oriented construction firms. The study 
found that the performance of construction mergers were positive at an insignificant level 
measured by equity market returns. The findings also showed that no significant perfor-
mance difference was observed between two diversification strategies. 
 
Post-merger performance of the acquiring firms has been also researched by Choi & Har-
matuck (2006) in the U.S. construction industry during 1980-2002. The study completes 
the earlier study by Choi & Russell (2004) and the purpose of it was to test three hypoth-
eses regarding actual operating performance after the merger: the change in synergistic 
gains measured by cash flow returns, the hypotheses of management welfare versus share-
holder wealth maximization and the consistency between short-term-based stock market 
return and long-term-based operating performance. The results showed that the synergis-
tic gains did not improve significantly after a merger and size of firms significantly in-
creased after the integration among operating performance. The findings supported the 
efficient market hypothesis as long-term operating performance were consistent with the 
findings of stock market returns on mergers by Choi & Russell (2004). 
 
Raudszus et al. (2014) have studied vertical diversification of mergers and whether it 
creates superior value in the construction industry. The study is based on the findings that 
vertical mergers and acquisitions create positive abnormal returns for the acquirer and in 
addition, it examines the idiosyncratic risk in stock returns. The study finds that vertical 
mergers have a larger wealth effect compared to horizontal mergers. However, Raudszus 
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et al. also find that risk behavior has a significant impact on wealth in the con- struction 
industry mergers and acquisitions and it should not be neglected as it has been done in 
earlier research such as Choi & Russell (2004) and Rottke, Schiereck & Pauser (2011). 
 
In contrary to Raudszus et al. (2014), Rozen-Bakher (2017) finds that horizontal mergers 
and acquisition have a larger wealth impact on the company in the construction industry 
than vertical transactions. In his study, Rozen-Bakher (2017) has investigated the differ-
ence in M&A success both horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers and acquisi-
tions. The examination has been done between two sectors: the industry sector and the 
services sector. The target of interest in this thesis, the construction industry, is considered 
as part of the industry sector in Rozen-Bakher’s (2017) study. The results show that hor-
izontal mergers and acquisitions are most beneficial in the integration process of industry 
sector companies whereas vertical M&A’s create value for service sector firms. For con-
glomerate deals, implementing synergies creates success in both sectors. 
 
Previous studies have shown that different deal characteristics have differing impacts on 
the success of the M&A. Epstein (2005) shows that the six keys to merger success are 
strategic vision and fit, deal structure, due diligence, pre-merger planning, post-merger 
integration and external factors. The study claims that previous studies of success and 
failure in M&As have been analyzed in narrow terms and uninformative measures such 
as short-term stock price movements and suggests that these six merger factors should be 
taken into consideration when evaluating merger success. 
 
External factors can concern for example economic cycles. These are studied in Eisen-
barth & Meckl (2014) as mentioned earlier in the introduction. Eisenbarth & Meckl 
(2014) divide the M&A decision-making of companies to anticyclical and procyclical 
behavior, indicating the period of either high or low asset prices when investing in trans-
actions. The study finds with a sample of 78 mergers and acquisitions that behavior in 
transactions is most often procyclical, meaning that transaction activity increases as the 
benchmark for stock market price level increases. A substantial amount of attention is 
given to merger waves and their development. A common merger and acquisition wave 
is typically divided into four stages; a low turning phase, an upturn, a high phase and a 
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downturn. During times with increasing positive future expectations, positive cashflows, 
growing economy and expansion companies tend to invest in mergers and acquisitions. 
Whether the M&A strategy does not take into consideration the following high point and 
eventually the downturn stage, the decision-making is often biased with a strong paradox 
of company value being increased through the transaction although the following down-
turn will in fact be value-decreasing. 
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5.   DATA & METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1.   Data description 
 
The data consists of recent M&A data from transactions occurring during the time period 
between January 2001 to January 2019. Table 1 represents the data criteria for the mergers 
and acquisitions. The time period is chosen due to the first merger or acquisition of the 
sample data occurring in January 2001 and the last in January 2019. Following restrictions 
for the data were applied. Only mergers and acquisitions with the deal status known were 
taken into the sample data. The parties of the merger or acquisition were also required to 
be in the construction industry and geographically located in Finland. This does not take 
into account construction industry subsidiaries operating in Finland with the parent com-
pany located in another company such as other Nordic countries for example. This limi-
tation to the data has been chosen due to the observation that favorable economic circum-
stances have enabled construction companies in Finland to invest in expansion through 
numerous mergers and acquisitions. There has also been little research in this industry 
during the previous year, especially on European and Nordic countries level. 
 
 
Table 1. Criteria for the mergers and acquisitions data. 
M&A data criteria 
1.   Deal announcement during time period of 2001 to 2019. 
2.   Deal status is completed. 
3.   The acquiring firm is in the construction industry. 
4.   The acquiring firm is publicly listed and traded in Helsinki Stock Exchange. 
5.   Over 50% of shares acquired in the transaction. 
6.   The deal is either a merger or an acquisition. 
 
 
The M&A data shows that the sample data consists of 59 events during 2001 to 2019 of 
which 13 are mergers and 46 acquisitions. A few mergers and acquisitions from 2000 
concerned acquiring firms that are no longer listed in the Helsinki stock exchange or 
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operating and these companies were thus left out of the sample. 56 of the total of 59 
mergers and acquisitions in the sample data have acquired 100 percent of the target firm. 
However, all transactions have achieved at least 50 percent of the target firm as it a re-
quirement for majority ownership. 
 
Since the profitability of a merger will be measured by abnormal returns of the acquiring 
firm’s stock price following the merger, the acquiring side data consists of only publicly 
traded and listed companies. This limitation has been done not only because listed stocks 
are the interest of the study but also due to difficulties in finding quantitative data on 
acquired firms that often are private. As the successfulness of a merger or acquisition is 
measured explicitly by the stock price development of the company before, during and 
after the transaction, it is required that the acquirer is publicly listed. In addition, effects 
on the acquired company are not a target of interest due to the acquired company most 
often moving its businesses to the acquiring company and thus, ending its own individual 
operations.  
 
Lastly, the share of ownership is required to be over 50 percent after the transaction which 
indicates majority ownership acquired through the merger or acquisition and the deal sta-
tus must be completed. 56 out of 59 mergers and acquisitions in the sample leads to own-
ership of 100 percent of the shares in the acquired company after the transaction. In the 
rest four transactions, the acquirer holds 50-99% of the shares in the target company after 
the transaction. The M&A data was collected from ThomsonReuters. 
 
To examine how the merger or acquisition affects the stock price development of the 
acquiring company, the data used for the investigation includes also stock price data of 
the publicly listed acquiring firms during the period between January 2001 and January 
2019. Stock price returns are compared to the chosen benchmark index, OMX Helsinki 
index. OMX Helsinki is the common index of Helsinki Stock Exchange which follows 
the price development of all stocks listed in the stock exchange.  
 
To investigate the empirical results of the second hypothesis, we divide the sample of 
mergers and acquisitions into horizontal and vertical transactions. In the sample data, the 
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target companies have been divided into different groups based on their mid-industry. 
The mid-industry of the horizontal mergers and acquisitions is building and construction 
and the industries of the vertical M&A’s are electronics, metals and mining, software, 
power, alternative energy sources, machinery, professional services, transportation and 
infrastructure, oil and gas, automobiles, advertising and marketing and other industrials. 
 
5.2.   Event study methodology 
 
As this research is based on certain events’ impacts on firm value, the research will be 
carried out by using event study methodology. Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll (1969) intro-
duced the event study methodology when studying the adjustment of stock prices on new 
information implicit in a stock split. The study found support to the conclusion that the 
markets are efficient, meaning that they reflect all available information and react rapidly 
to new information.  
 
Event study methodology is also covered in the study by MacKinlay (1997). According 
to this study, an event study measures the impact of a specific event such as mergers and 
acquisitions, earnings announcements and issues of new debt on the value of a firm. This 
impact is measured by using financial market data of security prices observed over a cer-
tain period. The study of event studies in economics and finance (MacKinlay 1997) is 
based on the assumption of efficient markets and the market-oriented way of evaluating 
the success of a mergers is the measure of cumulative abnormal returns in the period 
following the merger.  
 
Efficient markets have three forms depending on the strength of the impact they have on 
stock prices: weak, semi-strong and strong market efficiency. In weak market efficiency, 
prices do not follow a pattern and thus, large profits can not be made by examining the 
past prices of securities. Semi-strong market efficiency refers to a situation where security 
prices react immediately to announcements and new information. In addition to past price 
information on securities, the prices reflect also current information. According to the 
third form, strong market efficiency, security prices not only reflect past and current pub-
lic information but also current private information. Inside information is considered as a 
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part of the security price and one can not hold any information that can lead to superior 
profits. Thus, in the strong market efficiency form all possible information is believed to 
be reflected in the security prices. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2011: 317-318). 
 
The event study methodology begins by defining the event of interest, which in this case 
is a merger or an acquisition. The next step is to define the time period where security 
price movements are an interest regarding this event, the event window. This means not 
only choosing the exact time of event but also periods surrounding it. When using stock 
price data, it is important to include at least one day before and after the event to capture 
the effects of announcements announced after the stock market closes the same day. After 
defining the event window, one should define the restrictions for the firm of the event 
study. These may be restrictions regarding the industry of the firm or internal firm char-
acteristics. The fourth step is to calculate the estimated returns of the firm from which 
abnormal returns can be calculated (MacKinlay 1997). 
 
The chosen event windows for the investigation of the abnormal returns are [-1, 1] [-5, 
5], [-10, 10] and [-20, 20] days before and after the announcement of the merger or ac-
quisition. The day zero indicates the day of the announcement of the transaction. The 
particular event window is chosen to investigate the different short-term development of 
the stock price and abnormal returns. 
 
5.3.   Calculation models 
 
First, the percentage rate of returns of the different acquiring companies’ stocks are cal-
culated for each trading day during the period of January 2001 to January 2019. This is 
measured by using the following equation 1: 
 
 𝑅",$ = 	  𝑉$ − 𝑉$)*𝑉$)* 	  , (1) 
 
where R represents the rate of return for an individual stock or benchmark index i at time 
t, Vt is the value of the stock or index at time t which here indicates the closing price of 
day t and Vt-1 is the closing value of the stock or index at time t-1 (MacKinlay 1997).  
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We calculate the same daily percentage rate of return of the benchmark index, OMX Hel-
sinki (OMXH) for the time period of 2001 to 2009. Rmkt,t is the rate of return of the OMX 
Helsinki index at time t.  
 
Using the percentage rate of returns of the individual stocks and benchmark index, we are 
then able to calculate the abnormal returns (AR) between the same individual stocks and 
the benchmark index. Abnormal returns are the difference between the individual stocks 
and the benchmark index and thus the excess return generated from investing in the par-
ticular security. Abnormal return for a stock is calculated using the following equation 2:  
 
 𝐴𝑅",$ = 𝑅",$ − 𝑅,-$,$	  ,	  	   (2) 
 
where ARi,t is the abnormal return for stock i at time t, Ri,t is the rate of return for stock i 
at time t and Rmkt,t is the rate of return for the market index mkt, OMX Helsinki in this 
study at time t (MacKinlay 1997). 
 
Next, we calculate the average abnormal returns using the returns calculated in equation 
2 to obtain the average abnormal returns of multiple different events in the sample. 
 
 𝐴𝑅....$ = 1𝑁1𝐴𝑅",23"4* 	  ,	   (3) 
 
where 𝐴𝑅....$ is the average abnormal return of the sample events, N is the amount of events 
in the sample data and AR is the abnormal returns. (MacKinlay 1997.) 
 
After calculating the abnormal returns of each trading day for each merger or acquisition, 
we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) by aggregating the abnormal returns 
to conclude the continuum of these returns during the whole event window which in this 
study is either [-20, 20], [-10, 10], [-5, 5] or [-1, 1]. For this, we use equation 4: 
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 𝐶𝐴𝑅"(𝜏*, 𝜏8) = 1 𝐴𝑅"22:242; 	  , (4) 
 
where CARi is the cumulative abnormal return for stock i and (t1,t2) reflects the time 
period which in this study is the chosen event window. (MacKinlay 1997.) 
 
Finally, we calculate the cumulative average abnormal returns in the same way as the 
cumulative abnormal returns by using the average abnormal returns calculated in equation 
3.  
 𝐶𝐴𝑅......"(𝜏*, 𝜏8) = 1 𝐴𝑅....22:242; 	  , (5) 
 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅......" is the cumulative average abnormal returns and 𝐴𝑅....2 is the average abnormal 
returns. (MacKinlay 1997.) 
 
Finally, to test the statistical significance of the results from cumulative abnormal returns 
in each event window, we use the cross-sectional t-test with the following formula:  
 
 𝑡=>>? = 	  √𝑁 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑆=>>? 	  , (6) 
 
where tCAAR is the t-value, CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal returns and N is the 
amount of mergers and acquisitions in the sample. SCAAR is the standard deviation of the 
cumulative abnormal returns in the sample, also known as: 
 
 𝑆=>>?8 = 	   1𝑁 − 1	  1(𝐶𝐴𝑅"3"4* − 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅)8	  , (7) 
 
where CARi is the cumulative abnormal returns. 
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To examine whether the t-values received from the t-test are statistically significant, it is 
required to determine the level of significance, also known as the statistical rareness. 
When the results of the t-test are statistically significant, it is due to them occurring infre-
quently in a random sample in null hypothesis conditions. Most common levels of statis-
tical significance used in academic research are 1%, 5% and 10% levels (Carver 1978.) 
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6.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this chapter, the empirical results of the two hypotheses are presented. First, the out-
come of the first hypothesis regarding the cumulative abnormal returns of the whole sam-
ple of mergers and acquisitions is explained and secondly, the performance and results of 
horizontal and vertical transactions are presented. 
 
6.1.   Results on successful and unsuccessful mergers and acquisitions 
 
In this study, successful mergers or acquisitions are considered as transactions which lead 
to the stock price of the acquirer being positive at the end of each event window under 
investigation. The abnormal returns are examined in a [-20,20], [-10, 10], [-5, 5] and [-1, 
1] time window, presenting the results of average abnormal returns and cumulative aver-
age abnormal returns, also referred to as AAR and CAAR in the following tables. In ad-
dition to examining the development of the average and cumulative abnormal returns 
during the four event windows, we examine the final value of these returns and whether 
the stock value is positive or negative at the final day of each time window. In total, there 
are 59 mergers and acquisitions in the sample. 
 
 
Table 2. Cumulative abnormal returns for [-20, 20], [-10, 10], [-5, 5] and [-1, 1] event 
windows. 
 
 
 
Table 2 presents the results of testing the first hypothesis. It shows the statistics for the 
cumulative abnormal returns for all four event windows. None of the t-values of these 
event windows are statistically significant at 1%, 5% or 10% level of significance. This 
Mean Median Max. Min. Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis t-value N
[-20, 20] 0,11 % 0,82 % 21,42 % -36,39 % 0,11 -0,70 0,92 0,08      59
[-10, 10] -1,11 % 0,38 % 15,11 % -24,54 % 0,09 -0,68 0,45 -0,93 59
[-5, 5] 0,71 % -0,43 % 14,08 % -25,80 % 0,07 -0,80 3,03 0,77 59
[-1, 1] -0,001 % 0,32 % 12,62 % -12,14 % 0,04 -0,39 3,80 -0,003 59
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is probably due to the whole sample including both successful and unsuccessful which 
results in the t-value being near zero as positive and negative cumulative abnormal aver-
age returns adjusts one another to zero.  
 
The results in table 2 show that event window [-10, 10] has the highest t-value although 
not statistically significant. On average, the highest cumulative abnormal returns are 
found in the [-5, 5] event window. The highest cumulative average abnormal returns of 
an individual transaction occur in the [-20, 20] window where the returns are 21,42%. 
Similarly, the individual transaction destroying an aggregated amount of 36,39% of ac-
quirer stock value occurs in the same [-20, 20] event window. However, as the t-tests 
show statistical insignificance for all four event windows, the first hypothesis is rejected. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. AAR and CAAR for the [-20, 20] event window. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the performance of the sample data stock performance during the [-20, 
20] event window by measuring the average abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal 
returns. The figure presents that the average abnormal returns for this event window in 
the construction industry are unstable and although the stock market reacts positively to 
the merger or acquisition announcement at time 0, the stock price decreases back to the 
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pre-announcement level approximately at time +2. During [10, 20] the fluctuation in the 
average abnormal returns is smaller with an average abnormal return of -0,01% during 
this period compared to the average abnormal return of 0,08% during [-20, -10].  
 
The results of the [-20, 20] event window in figure 1 suggest that during this event period, 
the mergers and acquisitions in the sample do not generate positive abnormal returns 
when these returns are measured at time 20. The average abnormal returns at time 20 are 
-0,39% and the average cumulative abnormal returns -0,06%, and thus the impact of the 
announcements on the stock prices is slightly negative in the [-20, 20] event window. 
 
 
Table 3. Cumulative abnormal returns for successful and unsuccessful M&A’s [-20, 20].
 
 
 
For descriptive purposes of the variation between successful and unsuccessful M&A’s, 
the sample transactions are then divided into two groups depending on their success or 
failure to generate positive or negative stock price development at time 20. Table 3 shows 
the statistical information of the successful and unsuccessful M&A’s during the [-20, 20] 
event window. The sample of 59 mergers and acquisitions divides almost evenly in 30 
successful and 29 unsuccessful transactions. Among the successful transactions, the most 
successful merger or acquisition generates a 21,42% increase in the stock price from time 
-20 to 20. Vice versa, the most unsuccessful merger or acquisitions destroys 36,39% of 
the stock value during the [-20, 20] time frame.  
 
Mean Median Max. Min. Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis N
Successful 8,71 % 7,18 % 21,42 % 0,82 % 0,06 0,27 -1,07 30
Unsuccessful -8,78 % -6,67 % -0,07 % -36,39 % 0,09 -1,60 2,88 29
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Figure 2. CAAR for successful and unsuccessful M&A’s during the [-20, 20] event win-
dow. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the development of the successful and unsuccessful M&A groups during 
the [-20, 20] event window. The CAAR’s for successful and unsuccessful M&A’s at time 
20 are 8,71% and -8,78%, respectively. Successful mergers and acquisitions have a con-
stant positive increase of circa 5% in cumulative average abnormal returns both during 
time window [-20, 0] and [0, 20]. The cumulative average abnormal returns for the suc-
cessful transactions are 5,27% for [-20, 0] and 3,44% for [0, 20]. For the unsuccessful 
M&A’s portfolio, the cumulative average abnormal returns experience a larger decrease 
after the announcement during time window [0, 20] and at time [-20, 0] there is little 
fluctuation. The aggregated average abnormal returns for the unsuccessful portfolio are -
3,68% at [-20, 0] and -5,10% at [0, 20]. 
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Figure 3. AAR and CAAR for the [-10, 10] event window. 
 
 
Figure 3 presents the development of the stock price during the [-10, 10] event window. 
The figure of the average abnormal returns at time [0, 5] reflects the period after the mer-
ger or acquisition announcement and shows larger volatility in comparison to the time 
window [-5, 0] which reflects the time period before the announcement. At the end of the 
time period at day 10, the average abnormal returns are -0,19% indicating that in the end 
of this event window the average abnormal returns generate negative abnormal returns . 
Respectively, the cumulative average abnormal returns are -0,75%. 
 
 
Table 4. Cumulative abnormal returns for successful and unsuccessful M&A’s [-10, 10].  
 
 
 
Using the [-10, 10] event window, sample of 59 mergers and acquisitions continue divid-
ing evenly into successful and unsuccessful transactions. The most successful M&A fails 
to generate as high cumulative average abnormal returns as in the [-20, 20] event window 
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Average and cumulative average abnormal returns
[-10, 10]
AAR CAAR
Mean Median Max. Min. Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis N
Successful 5,67 % 5,17 % 15,11 % 0,07 % 0,04 0,71 -0,35 31
Unsuccessful -8,62 % -6,53 % -0,26 % -24,54 % 0,07 -1,26 0,51 28
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and respectively, the most negative cumulative average abnormal returns of the unsuc-
cessful portfolio succeeds to generate more positive, although still highly negative returns 
compared to the [-20, 20] event window. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. CAAR for successful and unsuccessful M&A’s during the [-10, 10] event win-
dow. 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the performance of the cumulative average abnormal returns in time frame 
[-10, 10]. It can be noted that during a more short-term event window, the CAAR’s tend 
to fluctuate more and the positive or negative increase is not as constant as in time window 
[-20, 20]. However, the cumulative average abnormal returns for the successful transac-
tions at time 10 are 5,67% which is 35% smaller than the returns at time 20 in the [-20, 
20] event window. For unsuccessful transactions, the CAAR is -8,62% at time 10. 
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Figure 5. AAR and CAAR for the [-5, 5] event window. 
 
 
Figure 5 presents average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for 
the [-5, 5] event window. Both AAR’s and CAAR’s generate positive returns at time 5, 
1,09% and 1,49% respectively. However, the reaction to the merger or acquisition an-
nouncement is negative at [0, 1] with abnormal returns decreasing by circa 1,1% on av-
erage. Similarly to the [-10, 10] event window, there is a trend of increasing positive 
interest in the stock prior to the announcement at time 0. These findings are consistent 
with the test results of Brealey et al. (2011) on pre-merger stock price development and 
fluctuation.  
 
 
Table 5. Cumulative abnormal returns for successful and unsuccessful M&A’s [-5, 5]. 
 
 
 
Table 5 divides the sample mergers and acquisitions in successful and unsuccessful deals 
and shows the statistical information for the [-5, 5] event window. The minimum returns 
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Average and cumulative average abnormal returns
[-5, 5]
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Mean Median Max. Min. Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis N
Successful 6,13 % 5,73 % 14,08 % 0,78 % 0,04 0,63 -0,68 28
Unsuccessful -4,18 % -2,63 % -0,07 % -25,80 % 0,05 -2,95 9,75 31
50 
 
in the table show that for the most unsuccessful transaction of the sample the cumulative 
abnormal returns decrease by 25,80% in ten days. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. CAAR for successful and unsuccessful M&A’s during the [-5, 5] event win-
dow. 
 
 
The development of cumulative average abnormal returns for the successful and unsuc-
cessful M&A groups are presented in figure 6. Successful and unsuccessful portfolios are 
generating steady returns during the [-5, 5] event window with the successful M&A’s 
being positive and the unsuccessful negative throughout the complete event window. For 
the successful portfolio, the CAAR’s increase at a slightly larger percentage on average. 
During [0, 5] the cumulative abnormal returns of the successful transactions increase 4% 
on average and thus, there are larger returns after the announcement of the deal compared 
to the pre-M&A period [-5, 0]. 
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Figure 7. AAR and CAAR for the [-1, 1] event window. 
 
 
Figure 7 presents the average abnormal returns and average cumulative abnormal returns 
for the sample stocks with the [-1, 1] time window. The figure consists of all the mergers 
and acquisitions carried out during the sample period from 2001 to 2019 in the chosen 
industry which makes it an appropriate measure of the abnormal returns in the construc-
tion industry transactions in Finland. This is also supported by the straightforwardness of 
the figure. Before the announcement of the merger or acquisition, the average abnormal 
returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns increase rapidly. The figure shows 
that after the announcement of a merger or acquisition at time 0, the market reacts nega-
tively to the announcement and the average abnormal returns decrease in the way that at 
time 1, the average abnormal returns are -0,20%. However, this decrease reaches approx-
imately to the same level as the average abnormal returns were one day before the deal 
announcement at time -1. 
 
Results on figure 7 are also consistent with the findings of Brealey at al. (2011). The stock 
markets are the semi-strong form of market efficiency as investors react immediately to 
the merger or acquisition announcement and this is reflected in the abnormal returns of 
the stock at time 1. Longer event windows such as [-20, 20], [-10, 10] and [-5, 5] show 
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the fluctuation after [0,1] as there is private information on the stock markets and markets 
attempt to price the securities on an adequate price level. 
 
 
Table 6. Cumulative abnormal returns for successful and unsuccessful M&A’s [-1, 1].  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. CAAR for successful and unsuccessful M&A’s, [-1, 1] event window. 
 
 
Using the [-1, 1] event window, there are 33 successful transactions and 26 unsuccessful 
when using the CAAR’s of time 1 as an indicator of the success of a deal. The cumulative 
abnormal returns are on average 2,14% and -2,72% for the successful and unsuccessful 
portfolios respectively. The cumulative abnormal returns of the most successful transac-
tion among the sample generates an increase of 12,62% in the abnormal returns in 2 days. 
The most unsuccessful deal destroys 12,14% of the stock value during the 2-day event 
window. 
 
Mean Median Max. Min. Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis N
Successful 2,14 % 1,30 % 12,62 % 0,21 % 0,02 2,82 10,42 33
Unsuccessful -2,72 % -1,63 % -0,05 % -12,14 % 0,03 -1,73 2,36 26
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Overall, it can be concluded that mergers and acquisitions have an immediate impact on 
the price of the acquiring company’s stock. There exists a decreasing trend in the security 
price after the M&A announcement at time 0 in this sample. However, there is not only 
large fluctuation in the price after the announcement but also during pre-announcement 
time period. This is in line with the assumptions of Brealey et al. (2011) that investors 
most often start noticing signs of possible coming mergers and acquisitions and thus, the 
stock price of the acquiring listed company gradually begins to increase or decrease cre-
ating fluctuation for the security price before the announcement at time 0. Similarly to 
Choi & Russell (2004), the measure of merger and acquisition success in this study are 
the cumulative abnormal returns. The findings support Choi & Russell’s (2004) findings 
that the additional value created through these mergers and acquisitions does not differ 
from zero significantly.  
 
The fluctuation post-announcement also indicates the uncertainty in the stock market. As 
mentioned earlier regarding market efficiency, semi-strong efficiency markets are not ca-
pable of including all possible information on the market, both public and private, in the 
stock price. Only public information is believed to be incorporated in the current security 
price. For this reason, there is uncertainty in the stock market and prices tend to fluctuate. 
It suggests that the markets are not capable of pricing the stock correctly and in the ade-
quate level immediately after the announcement at time 1. In case of strong efficiency 
market, the price or average abnormal returns would increase or decrease to a certain 
value or a certain percentage at time 1 immediately after the announcement and remain 
at the same level with zero fluctuation post time 1. 
 
These findings support the first hypothesis that mergers and acquisitions have a negative 
impact on firm value of the acquirer although the results are not statistically significant 
and thus, the first hypothesis is rejected at a confidence level of 95%. The results of the 
[-20, 20] and [-10, 10] event windows show that during these event periods, the mergers 
and acquisitions in the sample do not generate positive abnormal returns when the success 
is measured by the positive or negative sign of the cumulative average abnormal returns 
at the end of the event window. Event windows of [-5, 5] and [-1, 1] generate slightly 
positive cumulative average abnormal returns of 1,49% and 0,39%, respectively. 
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However, these results are not statistically significant. In addition, according to a study 
by Oler, Harrison & Aler (2008) event windows shorter than 5 days are considered as 
extremely short event windows for drawing conclusions of the success or failure of a 
merger or acquisition. Intermediate event windows of 6 to 60 days reduces the misinter-
pretation of the impacts of these kinds of announcements. 
 
6.2.   Results on vertical and horizontal mergers and acquisitions 
 
To investigate the second hypotheses of this study, we divide the complete sample of 
mergers and acquisitions in two portfolios of horizontal and vertical transactions depend-
ing on the characteristics of the target company. In horizontal mergers and acquisitions 
the acquirer operates in the same industry as the target company and in the case of the 
transaction, the operations of the companies replace one another. In vertical mergers and 
acquisitions the parties operate in a different stage of the supply chain that provides the 
product or service. The sample is divided into 23 horizontal and 36 vertical mergers and 
acquisitions. The chosen event windows for investigating the second hypothesis are [-20, 
20] and [-10, 10]. 
 
 
Table 7. Cumulative abnormal returns statistics for horizontal and vertical M&A’s,  
[-20, 20] event window. 
 
 
 
Table 7 shows the statistical information of the cumulative abnormal returns for horizon-
tal and vertical mergers and acquisitions in the [-20, 20] event window. The sample di-
vides to 23 horizontal and 36 vertical mergers and acquisitions. On average, vertical 
M&A’s create more value for the acquirer when measured by the average cumulative 
abnormal returns in a [-20, 20] event window. Horizontal M&A’s destroy acquirer value 
on average by generating negative cumulative abnormal returns of -0,64%. However, in 
Mean Median Max. Min. Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis t-value N
Horizontal -0,64 % 0,87 % 14,74 % -20,08 % 0,10 -0,41 -0,61 -0,29     23
Vertical 0,25 % 0,01 % 21,42 % -36,39 % 0,12 -0,87 1,53 0,12 36
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the complete sample the minimum CAR of -36,39% is generated by a vertical merger or 
acquisition. The largest cumulative abnormal returns of 21,42% at time 20 are generated 
by a vertical merger or acquisition. The t-test shows statistical insignificance for the [-20, 
20] event window. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Average abnormal returns for horizontal and vertical M&A’s, [-20, 20] event 
window. 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the average abnormal returns (AAR) for the horizontal and vertical mer-
gers and acquisitions during [-20, 20] event window. Fluctuation in the daily average 
abnormal returns is higher for horizontal transactions, the minimum being -1,01% and 
maximum 0,96%. For vertical transactions, the minimum is -1,10% and maximum 0,71%. 
Vertical mergers and acquisitions in the sample generate higher abnormal returns, how-
ever a moderate 0,0059% on average daily. There is a significant difference in the average 
abnormal returns between vertical and horizontal M&A’s after the announcement at time 
0. Horizontal transactions experience a steep decrease of average abnormal returns from 
0,86% to -0,66% during [0, 1]. At [1, 2] the average abnormal returns decrease further to 
-0,93%. For vertical M&A’s, abnormal returns generate on average positive returns al-
most immediately after the announcement. During event window [0, 1], AAR’s increase 
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from -0,15% to -0,01% and during [1, 2] the average abnormal returns increase further to 
a positive amount of 0,51%. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Cumulative average abnormal returns for horizontal and vertical M&A’s,  
[-20, 20] event window. 
 
 
Figure 10 shows the significant difference of the cumulative average abnormal returns of 
horizontal and vertical M&A’s. At time 20, horizontal transactions have on average de-
stroyed acquirer value by -0,92%, whereas vertical M&A’s have on average a positive 
value of 0,24%. Similar fluctuation in both horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisi-
tions can be seen in the CAAR’s of event window [-20, 20] as in the average abnormal 
returns in figure 9.  
 
 
Table 8. Cumulative abnormal returns statistics for horizontal and vertical M&A’s,  
[-10, 10] event window. 
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Mean Median Max. Min. Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis t-value N
Horizontal -0,84 % 1,35 % 15,11 % -24,54 % 0,10 -0,97 0,47 -0,39     23
Vertical -0,43 % 0,07 % 17,23 % -27,27 % 0,11 -0,62 0,28 -0,24 36
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Secondly, cumulative abnormal returns are examined in the [-10, 10] event window for 
both horizontal and vertical transactions. There is no significant difference in the maxi-
mum and minimum CAR of both type and both horizontal and vertical M&A’s generate 
on average negative cumulative abnormal returns of -0,84% and -0,43% respectively. The 
results of the [-10, 10] event window are not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Cumulative average abnormal returns for horizontal and vertical M&A’s,  
[-10, 10] event window. 
 
 
Figure 11 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns of horizontal and vertical 
transactions and shows that at the end of the event window at time 10, both transaction 
types generate on average negative CAR’s. For horizontal deals, the aggregated returns 
are -0,17% and -0,41% for vertical deals. The reaction to the merger announcement is 
positive for vertical transactions, potentially proposing that investors value vertical deals 
over horizontal ones. For horizontal mergers and acquisitions, there is an immediate neg-
ative reaction to the announcement which decreases CAAR’s during time window [0, 2]. 
 
The second hypothesis of this study proposed that vertical mergers create more value for 
the acquiring firm than horizontal mergers do in the Finnish construction industry. This 
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is measured by abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns at the end of chosen 
events windows, [-10, 10] and [-20, 20]. Overall, the results show that using the [-20, 20] 
event window vertical mergers and acquisition generate not only higher but also positive 
aggregated returns than horizontal transactions. However, the t-tests show that these re-
sults are not statistically significant.  
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7.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether mergers and acquisitions create value for 
the acquirer in the Finnish construction industry and whether there exists superior perfor-
mance in either horizontal or vertical transactions. The sample of the study consists of 59 
mergers and acquisitions carried out in the Finnish construction industry during the re-
search period of January 2001 to January 2019. Similarly to previous event studies, the 
measure of M&A success are the cumulative abnormal returns of the individual stocks. 
As the cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as the aggregated difference between 
the chosen benchmark, OMX Helsinki index and the stock price, it is required that all the 
acquiring firms in the sample are publicly listed and traded at the Helsinki Stock Ex-
change. Typical for event studies, multiple event windows are chosen to examine the 
CAR’s. In this study, the chosen event windows are [-20, 20], [-10, 10], [-5, 5] and [-1, 
1]. To examine the first hypothesis, the sample is first divided to successful and unsuc-
cessful mergers and acquisitions depending on their aggregated abnormal returns at the 
end of each event window. Furthermore, the sample is divided in horizontal and vertical 
mergers and acquisitions depending on the characteristics of the target firm to examine 
the second hypothesis. 
 
The field of mergers and acquisitions and their impacts on firm performance has been a 
target of large previous research. Favorable economic conditions after the recession in 
the beginning of the 21st century increased the amount of transactions in numerous indus-
tries and after the subprime crisis occurred a seventh merger wave as the economies re-
covered from the crisis. Increased activity in mergers and acquisitions have thus sparked 
interest also among academic research. In the construction industry mergers and acquisi-
tions have been seen as an essential part of corporate strategy aiming to accelerate growth, 
obtain synergies and expand operations to new market areas. 
 
Theories on why firms involve with mergers and acquisitions have been developed to 
gain understanding on the background for M&A’s. Theories of efficiency, synergies, hu-
bris, empire-building and size build a foundation on the reasons for carrying out mergers 
and acquisitions. As there has been a large amount of research in the field of mergers and 
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acquisitions, numerous key factors for M&A success have been identified and these have 
been divided in pre- and post-merger factors. The key factor of the pre-merger process is 
an overall strategy that considers the evaluation of the partner, the size of the target, com-
munication between parties, target valuation, the courtship period and future compensa-
tion policies. Post-merger factors consist of successful integration of the new target com-
pany, integration leadership and team, communication, realization of the synergies and 
possibly the most important post-merger factor, cultural fit. 
 
The first hypothesis of this study proposes that mergers and acquisitions have a negative 
impact on firm value of the acquirer measured by cumulative abnormal returns. Previous 
research has showed that on average mergers and acquisitions involve a high risk of fail-
ure and often create negative abnormal returns for the acquirer post-merger leading to a 
failed M&A deal. The success of a M&A deal has been seen as a combination of multiple 
exogenous and endogenous key matters, however one specific internal factor, corporate 
culture, is considered to be the main reason for post-merger integration to fail and even-
tually in fact lead to firm value destruction.  
 
The second hypothesis of the study is that vertical mergers create more value for the ac-
quirer through abnormal returns than horizontal mergers do. Previous research has shown 
support on the differing success of vertical and horizontal mergers and found that vertical 
M&A deals on average succeed to accelerate firm value better than horizontal deals do. 
The wealth impact of vertical mergers on acquiring firms can be more extensive compared 
to horizontal mergers as they can increase profitability of the firm but also enhance pro-
duction processes as the target company operates in a different stage of production than 
the acquirer in vertical mergers. 
 
To examine the hypotheses of this study, rate of return of individual stocks for each trad-
ing day in the chosen event windows were first calculated. The returns of each stock were 
then compared to the benchmark index OMX Helsinki to obtain abnormal returns. These 
abnormal returns were aggregated to obtain the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of 
the sample and the value of the abnormal return at the end of each event window. To test 
the statistical significance of these results, the cross-sectional t-test was carried out. 
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The results of the study show that there is fluctuation in the stock price of the acquirers 
not only pre-merger but also post-merger. Stock market participants begin noticing signs 
of possible future transactions and thus, the stock price of the listed firm gradually begins 
to fluctuate already before the deal announcement. Immediately after the announcement 
the stock market reacts to the new information and attempts to price the stock accordingly 
generating price volatility. The test results of the [-20, 20] and [-10, 10] event windows 
show that mergers and acquisitions in the Finnish construction industry do not generate 
positive abnormal returns when the success is measured by cumulative average abnormal 
returns. The remaining event windows of [-5, 5] and [-1, 1] generate slightly positive, 
however extremely marginal cumulative average abnormal returns of 1,49% and 0,39%, 
respectively. However, the results are not statistically insignificant. Thus, the first hy-
pothesis “Mergers and acquisitions have a negative impact on firm value of the acquirer 
in the Finnish construction industry” is rejected. 
 
The results for the second hypothesis show that using the largest event window in this 
study, vertical mergers and acquisitions generate positive and larger cumulative abnormal 
returns than horizontal transactions. Horizontal mergers and acquisitions generate in fact 
negative aggregated abnormal returns. However, these results are found to be statistically 
insignificant. Thus, it can be concluded that the results reject the second hypothesis “Ver-
tical mergers create more value for the acquirer through abnormal returns than horizon-
tal mergers do”.  
 
The study has some limitations regarding the sample data and methodology. In order to 
obtain more statistically significant results, the sample data could include a larger amount 
of M&A cases. The statistical insignificance in the results of this study can also be due to 
factors behind the mergers and acquisitions that have not been taken into consideration 
and thus have resulted in certain type of mergers and acquisitions to be included in the 
sample. The sample data consists of Finnish publicly listed companies in the construction 
industry and the results are thus rather specific and concentrated on one country. The 
Nordic countries are well-known for their construction industry and pristine services and 
have been a target of large domestic and cross-country interest in mergers and acquisi-
tions. When limiting the data on only Finnish firms, a vast amount of both large and 
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smaller Nordic mergers and acquisitions in the research period carried out by firms oper-
ating actively in Finland but not Finnish origin are left out.  
 
Furthermore, the research is carried out using typical event windows for this kind of re-
search in stock performance of mergers and acquisitions and other event studies. How-
ever, used event windows this short can lead to misinterpreting results and drawing biased 
conclusions of stock market performance. Thus, as a proposal of further research the hy-
potheses could be examined in longer event periods to obtain a more extensive outlook 
of the actual impacts of the deal on the stock value. As the stock market is also being 
heavily influenced with the economic conditions and possible crisis, further research 
could take these periods of crisis into consideration in interpreting the stock performance 
and merger activity. 
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